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INTRODUCTION 
“[W]ithout story,” Margaret Atwood writes in a recent account of lite-
rature and debt, “there is no debt.”  “A story is a string of actions occurring 
over time,” she explains: 
[O]ne damn thing after another, as we glibly say in creative writing classes—and 
debt happens as a result of actions occurring over time.  Therefore, any debt in-
volves a plot line: how you got into debt, what you did, said, and thought while 
you were in there, and then—depending on whether the ending is to be happy or 
sad—how you got out of debt, or else how you got further and further into it until 
you became overwhelmed by it, and sank from view.1 
If debt is a story, so too is bankruptcy, where more than a million Ameri-
cans go each year to, in the words of an earlier commentator whom we will 
see again, “atone[] for [their financial] sins.”2 
These stories—the “honest but unfortunate debtor” who seeks a fresh 
start,3 the business that is viable but choking with debt—are obscured in the 
individual judicial opinions that are legal scholars’ stock in trade.  Read a 
contract or corporate law decision and you often will encounter a complete 
narrative of the parties’ interactions, sometimes with a clearly delineated 
  
 ∗ S. Samuel Arsht Professor of Corporate Law, University of Pennsylvania.  I am 
grateful to Bob Weisberg for helpful comments. 
 1. MARGARET ATWOOD, PAYBACK: DEBT AND THE SHADOW SIDE OF WEALTH 81 
(2008). 
 2. THURMAN W. ARNOLD, THE FOLKLORE OF CAPITALISM 233 (1937). 
 3. This staple of American bankruptcy lore was first given Supreme Court impri-
matur in Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934). 
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plot.  There are “saints” and “sinners” in Delaware corporate law opinions, 
as a much-cited commentary puts it, 4 and richly textured narratives of direc-
tors’ performances as faithful or unfaithful fiduciaries.5  Not so with most 
bankruptcy opinions.  In the course of a big case, bankruptcy judges some-
times produce five or six judicial opinions, each dwelling on a few basic 
facts as applied to a technical statutory provision.  These decisions usually 
contain only the fragments of a narrative; they are the shards of a larger 
story. 
That larger story is the case as a whole.  When a company like Chrys-
ler or United Airlines files for bankruptcy, the participants develop—and 
often contest—a master narrative that consists of two intertwined stories.6  
The first concerns the reasons for the company’s financial distress and the 
second the way forward.  In the unusual case where everyone agrees that the 
business is not viable, the overall narrative indicates that it is time to close 
the business down and sell its assets for whatever they will bring as scrap.  
More often, the debtor’s representatives will insist that the business has 
great promise, but has been throttled by too much debt or an unexpected 
economic shock.  The company, they will argue, is worth preserving—just 
like the railroads that were restructured in the early days of American cor-
porate reorganization and the many businesses that have been reorganized 
in the century since.7 
Creditors or other parties who are unpersuaded or would fare better if 
the bankruptcy was resolved differently may challenge the debtor’s narra-
tive.  The simplest counter-narrative suggests that the business is not viable 
at all, and cannot realistically be restructured.  This challenge is a familiar 
feature of bankruptcies involving small companies; it is less common with 
larger companies. 
  
 4. Edward B. Rock, Saints and Sinners: How Does Delaware Corporate Law 
Work?, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1009 (1997). 
 5. A chancery court opinion excoriating Michael Eisner’s dictatorial reign as chief 
executive officer at Disney is often cited as evidence of the latter.  In re Walt Disney Co. 
Deriv. Litig., 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006).   
 6. The scholarly literature on master narratives and on narrative generally is legion.  
In a helpful overview, Michael Bamberg notes that “there seem to be two different interpre-
tations of the term ‘master narratives’; one claiming (in a more narrow sense) the existence 
of master narratives that delineate how narrators position themselves with their story; the 
other arguing in a much broader sense that speakers are principally subjected to grand récits 
and metanarratives from which there seems to be no escape.”  Michael Bamberg, Consider-
ing Counter Narratives, in CONSIDERING COUNTER-NARRATIVES: NARRATING, RESISTING, 
MAKING SENSE 351, 359 (Michael Bamberg & Molly Andrews eds., 2004).  I use the term in 
the first, narrower sense in this Essay. 
 7. The emergence of America’s large-scale reorganization procedure in response to 
the railroad failures of the nineteenth century is chronicled in DAVID A. SKEEL, JR., DEBT’S 
DOMINION: A HISTORY OF BANKRUPTCY LAW IN AMERICA (2001). 
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In support of its claim that the business is worth saving, the company 
may argue that it simply needs time to renegotiate its obligations with its 
creditors.  Alternatively, it may say that asset values are deteriorating rapid-
ly and it is imperative that the bankruptcy court immediately approve a sale 
of the company, or some other rapid disposition.  These two possibilities 
correspond to the principal resolution narratives in current Chapter 11 bank-
ruptcy practice, which I will refer to as “Debtor in Control” and “No Time 
to Spare.”8 
Chrysler’s bankruptcy vividly illustrates the No Time to Spare narra-
tive.  When Chrysler filed for bankruptcy at the insistence of the President 
and his Auto Taskforce in late April 2009, its lawyers assured the bankrupt-
cy court that the company had been battered by the economic crisis, but 
could be restructured and preserved if the judge quickly approved the sale 
of its assets to a new entity that would be managed by Fiat.  If the judge 
thwarted the sale, on the other hand, Chrysler and its subsidiaries would 
“likely face the immediate, piecemeal liquidation of their assets in a severe-
ly depressed market.”9  Shortly after Chrysler received the blessing of the 
bankruptcy court, General Motors filed for bankruptcy in the same district, 
and invoked the same narrative.  The company could be saved, but there 
was No Time to Spare.10 
Although their lawyers invoked the No Time to Spare narrative, 
Chrysler and GM were unlikely No Time to Spare cases.11  Both compa-
nies—particularly General Motors—were obvious candidates for Debtor in 
Control treatment.  Debtor in Control was the standard resolution narrative 
for large-scale corporate bankruptcies for the first decade after the enact-
ment of the current bankruptcy laws in 1978.  Debtor in Control, with its 
  
 8. I have borrowed the “Debtor in Control” label—but have removed the word 
“full” in order to give it a slightly less pejorative connotation—from a well known article by 
Lynn LoPucki.  Lynn M. LoPucki, The Debtor in Full Control—Systems Failure Under 
Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code?, 57 AM. BANKR. L.J. 99 (1983). 
 9. Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion of Debtors & Debtors in Possession 
at 2, In re Chrysler LLC, No. 09-09-50002 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. May 3, 2009), 2009 WL 
5131346 [hereinafter Memorandum in Support of Chrysler Sale]. 
 10. “It is imperative that the 363 Transaction be expeditiously approved,” the deb-
tors warned in their motion in support of the sale.   
Any delay in the consideration of this Motion will result in continuing and 
increasing revenue erosion and further loss of market share to other domestic 
and foreign manufacturers that are not suffering aggravated financial dis-
tress.  Absent prompt confirmation that the sale has been approved and that 
the transfer of the assets will be implemented, it is highly probable that GM 
will have to liquidate.   
Debtors’ Motion to Approve the Sale at 5, In re Gen. Motors Corp., 409 B.R. 24 (Bankr. 
S.D.N.Y. 2009) (No. 09-50026), 2009 WL 1529573. 
 11. Lehman Brothers, by contrast, which we will also consider in this Essay, was a 
true No Time to Spare case.  See infra Part II. 
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sometimes-extended negotiations between the debtor’s managers and its 
creditors, works best with companies whose principal assets are tangible 
and unlikely to deteriorate rapidly.  Railroads, airlines, and manufacturing 
businesses fit this traditional profile.  In recent years, companies increasing-
ly have invoked the No Time to Spare narrative, often because the compa-
nies’ principal assets are technology and human capital, whose value may 
quickly disappear.  The invocation of the No Time to Spare narrative by the 
automakers, which are classic bricks-and-mortar companies, could suggest 
that the old Debtor in Control narrative has been or soon will be fully dis-
placed.12  If Chrysler and GM were not treated as Debtor in Control cases, 
perhaps no company will be. 
Such a shift in narratives would hardly be the first.  In the early twen-
tieth century, the standard resolution narrative fit a pattern I will call Banker 
Paternalism.  When a railroad or other large corporation filed for bankrupt-
cy, the investment banks that had sold the now-bankrupt entity’s stock or 
bonds set up committees to represent each class of shareholders or bond-
holders in the negotiations with the debtors’ managers over the terms of a 
reorganization.  The bankers portrayed themselves as vigilant defenders of 
the interests of the ordinary investors they represented.  Their Progressive 
and New Deal era critics, on the other hand, were not so sure. 
The Essay begins with this earlier era, both to provide context for 
more recent developments and to illustrate some of the effects of a regnant 
master narrative for bankruptcy practice and bankruptcy reform.  I then will 
move to the present, and use the Lehman and automaker bankruptcies to 
explore the relationship between the Debtor in Control and No Time to 
Spare resolution narratives, and the very different emotional appeal that 
characterizes each.  This will lead to a more general discussion of the signi-
ficance of resolution narratives—and to my claim that two narratives, and 
two underlying approaches, may be preferable to a single dominant para-
digm. 
I. THE BANK PATERNALISM NARRATIVE 
Back in the day—the late nineteenth and early twentieth century era 
when the first corporation reorganization procedure was devised—railroads 
and then other corporations reorganized through a jerry-built process known 
  
 12. The shift in bankruptcy practice reflected in the rise of the No Time to Spare 
narrative is chronicled in the recent bankruptcy literature.  See, e.g., David A. Skeel, Jr., 
Creditors’ Ball: The “New” New Corporate Governance in Chapter 11, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 
917 (2003) [hereinafter Skeel, Creditors’ Ball]; Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, 
The End of Bankruptcy, 55 STAN. L. REV. 751 (2002). 
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as the equity receivership.13  When a railroad threatened to default, a credi-
tor, usually with the full knowledge and approval of the debtor’s managers, 
would ask a court to appoint a receiver to take control of the company’s 
property.  Creditors who held bonds secured by mortgages on the railroad’s 
property would initiate a foreclosure proceeding.  Rather than ousting the 
debtor’s managers and precipitating a sale of the railroad’s property, as 
would ordinarily be the case with receivership and foreclosure, these proce-
dures simply set the stage for a renegotiation of the railroad’s obligations.  
A manager of the railroad or some other friendly party would serve as re-
ceiver, and the foreclosure sale would be postponed indefinitely.14  
Meanwhile, the investment banks that had sold classes of the debtor’s 
stock or bonds would create committees to represent the stock or bondhold-
ers in the negotiations, and ask investors to “deposit” their stock or bonds 
with the committees.  The debtor and its investment banks, together with the 
banks’ lawyers, would negotiate the terms of a restructuring.  When the 
parties reached agreement, the bankers would combine all of the committees 
into a single reorganization committee, and everyone would inform the 
court that they were ready for the foreclosure sale.  The only bidder at the 
sale would be the reorganization committee itself.15  Its bid would consist of 
the old stocks and bonds, plus enough cash for a modest payment to any 
investors who had refused to go along with the transaction. 
This overview is quite sanitized, of course.  Sometimes the railroad 
and its banks were at loggerheads, or the court would refuse to appoint an 
insider as receiver.  Sometimes, an outsider would set up its own committee 
and try to wrest control of the process away from debtor’s principal invest-
ment banks.  There were corporate raiders in the early twentieth century, 
just as there are now.16  But the general process, with or without these and 
  
 13. See, e.g., SKEEL, supra note 7, at 48-70.  Several of the best known contempora-
neous accounts of the practice are cited in the discussion below. 
 14. See, e.g., SEC, REPORT ON THE STUDY AND INVESTIGATION OF THE WORK, 
ACTIVITIES, PERSONNEL AND FUNCTIONS OF PROTECTIVE AND REORGANIZATION COMMITTEES 
8: 33 (1937) (noting that “the receiver or trustee was affiliated with the [debtor], as director, 
officer, stockholder, etc.” in 59% of the cases the SEC examined in 1935, and in many of the 
other cases “the receiver or trustee had connections with the underwriters of the issuer’s 
securities”) [hereinafter SEC REPORT]. 
 15. “Counsel who have acted frequently for reorganization committees have spent a 
great many anxious hours preparing for the unexpected bidder,” Paul Cravath stated in 1916, 
“but in my own experience he has never appeared.”  Paul D. Cravath, The Reorganization of 
Corporations; Bond-Holders’ and Stockholders’ Protective Committees; Reorganization 
Committees; and the Voluntary Recapitalization of Corporations (Mar. 1 & 8, 1916) in 
FANCIS LYNDE STETSON ET AL., SOME LEGAL PHASES OF CORPORATE FINANCING, 
REORGANIZATION AND REGULATION 204 (1917). 
 16. In The Folklore of Capitalism, Thurman Arnold chronicles one of these battles, a 
contest over the remains of the Kreuger-Toll empire built by Ivar Krueger, the Swedish 
Match King.  A high profile group of insurgents, represented by Samuel Untermeyer, chal-
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other complicating wrinkles, was used to reorganize countless troubled cor-
porations, including nearly every major American railroad.  The foundation 
of the process as it evolved was the Bank Paternalism narrative. 
As the banks and their lawyers told the story, the banks stepped to the 
front when a railroad defaulted in order to protect the scattered investors 
who owned its stock and bonds.  They collected fees for helping restructure 
a railroad, of course, but they were more concerned to do good than to do 
well.  The banks and lawyers were investors’ champions, and by helping to 
put a struggling railroad back on firmer footing, they were doing a public 
service as well.  Each time it rescued a troubled corporation, J.P. Morgan 
showed the same public spiritedness that the bank demonstrated by inter-
vening to restore confidence when the American financial system threatened 
to collapse in 1907.17 
The best-known account of early twentieth century reorganization 
techniques is suffused with the assumptions of the Bank Paternalism narra-
tive.  Paul Cravath, the leading reorganization lawyer of his day, and a na-
mesake of the still prominent law firm now known as Cravath, Swaine & 
Moore, offered an insider’s account of a large reorganization in 1917.  
“While you have been preparing the receivership papers,” he stated, “it may 
be assumed that your client, the banker, has been engaged in forming a 
bondholders’ protective committee, in which event it becomes part of your 
task to draw the Bondholders’ Protective Agreement appointing the com-
mittee, defining its powers and providing for the deposits of bonds the-
reunder.”18  The primary objective of the agreement, he explained, “is to 
confer upon the committee the power to take any action it may deem neces-
sary or proper for the protection of the bondholders and the enforcement of 
  
lenged the incumbent bankers.  “This particular campaign was bitter,” Arnold reports.  But 
the parties reached a truce, with the insurgents being offered a stake in the management.  
“After the coalition,” Arnold concludes, “it was noticeable that the charges and counter-
charges suddenly ended.  Mr. Untermyer developed the greatest respect for the firm of Sulli-
van and Cromwell [the incumbents’ lawyers], which the firm reciprocated . . . .”  ARNOLD, 
supra note 2, at 243-44. 
 17. The narrative was not simply a self-justifying concoction of the banks; it was 
based at least in part in reality.  J.P. Morgan rose to prominence in the nineteenth century by 
persuading jittery European investors to invest in companies Morgan sponsored, despite the 
investors’ distrust of American markets.  See, e.g., RON CHERNOW, THE HOUSE OF MORGAN: 
AN AMERICAN BANKING DYNASTY AND THE RISE OF MODERN FINANCE 29-45 (1990).  Alan 
Morrison and Bill Wilhelm make the same point in more general terms.  “[T]he investment 
banks played an important role in the foundation of the railroads,” they write, “and both their 
reputations and their financial capital were closely tied up with the success of their offerings.  
They therefore had a vested interest in resolving financial distress when it arose.”  ALAN D. 
MORRISON & WILLIAM J. WILHELM, JR., INVESTMENT BANKING: INSTITUTIONS, POLITICS, 
AND LAW 176-77 (2007). 
 18. Cravath, supra note 15, at 162. 
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their rights.”19  Because this agreement is the source of the bank’s authority, 
the “powers conferred . . . cannot well be too broad.”20 
For the bankers and lawyers who invoked it, the Bank Paternalism 
narrative provided a template for a messy and complicated process, and 
assigned each party a straightforward role.  The bankers and lawyers could 
rely on their experience in earlier cases.  “Do not attempt to evolve the 
agreement out of your own consciousness,” as Cravath put it, “for it would 
take you days to work out clauses covering half of the contingencies for 
which provision should be made.”21  Speaking later of the agreement used to 
effect the final reorganization, Cravath extolled its standard provisions as 
“the result of the experience and prophetic vision of a great many able law-
yers.”22  More generally, the bankers and their lawyers could invoke the 
repeated history of previous cases as a means of persuading a court to sign 
off on the process in each new case. 
The emotional valence of the narrative was of that of reassuring calm.  
The bankers and lawyers assured the court that everything was under con-
trol, and that they had investors’ interests at heart.  Robert Swaine, Cra-
vath’s protégé at the Cravath firm, recounted, for instance, “three days of 
friendly debate” in the chambers of the judge overseeing the reorganization 
of the St. Louis and San Francisco railroad, during which Swaine patiently 
persuaded him to approve an innovative alternative to making a cash pay-
ment to lower priority creditors, as a recent Supreme Court decision had 
seemed to require.23 
The same qualities that made the standard narrative so useful—its fa-
miliarity, the guidance it provided in case after case—also had a dark side.  
While many corporate failures neatly fit the Banker Paternalism story, some 
did not.  The story assumed, for instance, that the company would need to 
be restructured internally through an artificial sale that did not really allow 
for competing bidders.  The bankers and the company’s managers, not some 
outside group, would decide what was best for the company.  In cases where 
outsiders did emerge and challenge the inside group, the Banker Paternalism 
narrative could be used to stymie their challenge.24  
  
 19. Id. at 162-63. 
 20. Id. at 163 (emphasis added). 
 21. Id. at 164. 
 22. Id. at 178. 
 23. ROBERT T. SWAINE, I THE CRAVATH FIRM AND ITS SUCCESSOR 172 (1946).   
 24. Summarizing their studies of the challenges mounted by outsiders in Paramount 
Publix, Krueger & Toll, Celotex and several other cases, for instance, the SEC investigators 
concluded that: 
Generally, opposition is not organized until the insiders are well on the way to 
complete control of the reorganization.  For this reason, as well as the strategic po-
sition, prestige, and resources of the insiders, it is the highly exceptional case in 
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In the 1910s, and then with increasing intensity in the 1930s, critics at-
tacked the Bank Paternalism narrative, subjecting it to sometimes hilarious 
ridicule.  The most famous early attack, in Louis Brandeis’s popular book 
Other People’s Money, was earnest and alarmed.25  A small coterie of 
banks—the Money Trust, he called them—dominated American finance, 
cutting off competition to the detriment of everyone else.  The banks’ con-
trol of the receivership process was, Brandeis argued, a key component of 
their monopoly.  “We must break the Money Trust,” he concluded, “or the 
Money Trust will break us.”26  Two decades later, Jerome Frank remarked, 
in an aside about the maneuverings of the best-known reorganization law-
yers, that “the word ‘prestige’ is derived, so the philologists tell us, from the 
same root as ‘prestidigitator.’”27 
Several New Deal critics assessed Bank Paternalism in explicitly rhe-
torical terms.  In a review of The Investor Pays, a muckraking book by Max 
Lowenthal about the controversial reorganization of the St. Paul Railroad, 
Roger Foster contrasted “the fictitious drama staged by the bankers and 
their lawyers for courts and public” with the “real” story.28  “In the fictitious 
story,” he writes: 
[T]he directors employ expert engineers to make a survey, learn from them that the 
road can not earn existing charges . . . and vote to have the road consent to a recei-
vership which one of its creditors happened to be seeking. . . .  Certain bond and 
stockholders organize protective committees.  The committees induce the bankers 
to prepare a plan and agree to it when it is prepared, and ask the bankers as reor-
ganization managers to carry it out.29 
“The real story,” which “bears little resemblance to the bankers’ story,” was 
more ominous.30  “Hanauer of [the investment bank] Kuhn, Loeb and their 
lawyer, Swaine, precipitated the receivership, decided on their plan and 
  
which the independents can hope to win substantial support—let alone enough 
support to enable them to put through a program of their own. 
SEC REPORT, supra note 14, at 24. 
 25. LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY: AND HOW THE BANKERS USE IT 
(1913).  The book originated as a widely read series of articles in Harper’s magazine.  Id. at 
v. 
 26. Id. at 201. 
 27. Jerome N. Frank, Some Realistic Reflections on Some Aspects of Corporate 
Reorganization, 19 VA. L. REV. 541, 542-43 (1933).  In the second part of this article, Frank 
offered up something of an apology to Robert Swaine, the principal butt of Frank’s joke.  
“The writer trusts that his attempted facetiousness (in the first installment of this paper) when 
referring to Mr. Swaine,” Frank wrote, “will not indicate any lack of respect for Mr. 
Swaine’s brilliance . . . in this field.  On the other hand, the writer does venture to disagree 
flatly with several of Mr. Swaine’s positions on the subject.”  Id. at 698, 709 n.97. 
 28. Roger S. Foster, Book Review, 43 YALE L.J. 352, 353 (1933) (reviewing MAX 
LOWENTHAL, THE INVESTOR PAYS (1933)). 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
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jammed it through without giving either security holder or public authority 
any real voice in the matter.”31  Foster acknowledged that “[t]he lawyer with 
some experience in reorganization practice . . . will be indignant at Lowen-
thal for making his cherished, familiar, necessary fictions take on a sinister 
cast.  He will see nothing reprehensible in what was done by Hanauer and 
Swaine, the principal villains of the book.”32  But Foster sides squarely with 
Lowenthal, praising “[t]his devastating explosion of the myth that security 
holders agree on a plan, this unsurpassed exposition of just how one of the 
great private banking houses can arrange a reorganization.”33 
A massive Securities and Exchange Commission study initially over-
seen by William Douglas offered a parallel critique, but with a slightly dif-
ferent emphasis.  “The formation of a protective committee has long been 
regarded a prerogative of the inside group,” the reporters wrote at the end of 
the first volume.34  “Bankers responsible for the original distribution of se-
curities in default commonly profess a ‘moral obligation to protect the secu-
rity holders’ in these situations.  As a complement to their own activity in 
forming protective committees in response to moral obligations,” the re-
porters continue, perhaps with a wisp of sarcasm, “outside interference with 
their control is deemed to be poaching on their own preserves.”35  While 
agreeing wholeheartedly about the existence of a moral obligation, the re-
porters questioned bankers’ commitment to it.  “The trouble has been,” they 
conclude, that bankers’ and managers’ “claims to a dominant voice in reor-
ganization . . . have been exerted too frequently on behalf of their own in-
terests.”36 
Just how important was the Bank Paternalism narrative to the banks’ 
influence in these cases?  According to a standard critique of narrative or 
law-and-literature analysis, not very.  A narrative skeptic would point out 
that the bankers relied on established techniques to gain control in these 
cases, e.g., making use of an already compiled list of investors formed from 
selling the company’s securities, and asking the investors to deposit their 
securities with the bank’s committee.  The narrative skeptic would conclude 
that the real-world techniques fully explain the reorganization.37  The Bank 
Paternalism narrative is simply a label used to describe a process that could 
be fully explained without it. 
  
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. at 355. 
 33. Id. 
 34. SEC REPORT, supra note 14, at 1:874. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
 37. For the importance of having the investors’ list, see, e.g., ARNOLD, supra note 2, 
at 244 (“[N]ot being in possession of the lists of security-holders, and not having the finan-
cial prestige of the conservative group, [the insurgents in the Kreuger-Toll case] were able to 
get hold of only one fourth as many bonds as were deposited with the conservative party.”). 
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The New Dealers’ response to the Bank Paternalism narrative sug-
gests, to the contrary, that they took the narrative very seriously.  Efforts to 
debunk Bank Paternalism were a key feature of the case for reform.  To 
expose the bankers’ supposed moral commitment to investors as a sham, the 
reformers devised and repeatedly invoked a counter-narrative that portrayed 
the bankers and their lawyers as seizing control in an undemocratic fashion 
and feathering their own nests at the expense of investors.  One version of 
the counter-narrative analogized the bankers to machine politics.  “In reor-
ganizations,” Roger Foster wrote in 1935: 
[T]he banker has managed the financial body politic much as machine organiza-
tions have managed municipal politics. . . .  Like Tammany, the wise bankers have 
adapted their government to the more permanent tendencies of human nature, ra-
ther than those moral abstractions that sometimes get written into law.  They have 
managed to dispense patronage and warp the application of principles with a view 
to appeasing aggressive, articulate and influential constituents.  The timid souls, 
the guileless and confiding masses, have been forgotten men.38 
In The Folklore of Capitalism, Thurmond Arnold developed a similar meta-
phor in more elaborate detail.  A corporate reorganization, he wrote: 
[I]s a combination of a municipal election, a historical pageant, an antivice cru-
sade, a graduate school seminar, a judicial proceeding, and a series of horse trades, 
all rolled into one—thoroughly buttered with learning and frosted with distin-
guished names.  Here the union of law and economics is celebrated by one of the 
wildest ideological orgies in intellectual history.  Men work all night preparing 
endless documents in answer to other endless documents . . . .  At the same time 
practical politicians utilize every resource of patronage, demagoguery, and coer-
cion beneath the solemn smoke screen.39 
As the New Dealers’ attentions suggest, the Bank Paternalism narra-
tive was hardly an inconsequential gloss.  Just as the narrative’s significance 
should not be understated, however, it also should not be exaggerated.  
Challenges to the prevailing narrative figured prominently, but the refor-
mers also debated Robert Swaine and other defenders of current reorganiza-
tion practice in more lawyerly terms and used empirical evidence to buttress 
the case for reform.40 
The influence of the Bank Paternalism narrative is perhaps best seen 
in stylized, historical terms.  The reorganization techniques came first in the 
nineteenth century—the cobbling together of the equity receivership device 
from traditional receivership and foreclosure law.41  The Bank Paternalism 
narrative was then used both to justify the revolutionary new practice and to 
  
 38. Roger S. Foster, Conflicting Ideals for Reorganization, 44 YALE L.J. 923, 923-
24 (1935). 
 39. ARNOLD, supra note 2, at 230. 
 40. The most detailed empirical evidence was compiled in the multi-volume SEC 
report described earlier.  See supra note 14. 
 41. See, e.g., SKEEL, supra note 7, at 48-70. 
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persuade courts to give their imprimatur to additional innovations that were 
devised to deal with new problems.  The narrative helped banks and their 
lawyers to explain why a judge should approve a sham foreclosure sale, and 
should limit the remedies of dissenting investors.  The banks and their law-
yers could be trusted, the narrative suggested, because they were bound by a 
moral obligation to protect their investors.  The narrative thus emerged from 
the new reorganization technique, but also reinforced and extended it. 
The narrative had equally profound implications for the New Dealers 
who sought to “democratize” corporate reorganization: Banker Paternalism, 
and especially their alternative narrative, defined the potential paths of 
reform.  Because bankers and their lawyers were self-appointed and only 
pretended to protect the investors they represented, reform should either 
empower investors directly or provide them with a different champion.42  
The reforms that emerged sought to combine these objectives.43  They pro-
hibited any banker or lawyer that had represented a company prior to bank-
ruptcy from participating in the reorganization, thus deposing investors’ 
previous champions.  The investors’ new champions would be an indepen-
dent trustee, who would take over the business in bankruptcy, and the SEC, 
which would police the reorganization process and offer its assessment of 
any proposed reorganization plan.44  Once the trustee developed a proposed 
reorganization plan and the SEC had offered its assessment, the sharehold-
ers and creditors would vote whether to approve the plan. 
The battle over corporate reorganization in the 1930s centered on 
competing versions of the same master narrative.  While the complexity of 
large-scale corporation bankruptcy and the need for coordination—in con-
trast, say, to an ordinary trial—causes it to gravitate toward a single narra-
tive,45 one can easily imagine multiple narratives, each of which defines a 
  
 42. These two strategies imply very different conceptions of investor democracy, of 
course.  The second approach reflects that high view of elite expertise held by many of the 
New Dealers. 
 43. In the book review discussed earlier, Roger Foster focused more intensely on the 
former objective, calling for more meaningful bondholder voice in the choice of their repre-
sentative: “Let machinery be provided for bondholder election of representatives by plurality 
or majority vote,” he argued, “with [the] requirement that candidates disclose, or free them-
selves from, inconsistent interests . . . .  To dislodge the bankers, the reformer will be forced 
to change his democratic slogan and call in Democracy at large.”  Foster, supra note 28, at 
357. 
 44. See, e.g., SKEEL, supra note 7, at 119-23 (describing the proposed reforms, 
which were enacted as part of the Chandler Act of 1938). 
 45. Although the narrative structure of trials takes a wide variety of forms, even here 
the narratives tend to draw on a limited number of templates.  See, e.g., ANTHONY G. 
AMSTERDAM & JEROME BRUNER, MINDING THE LAW 118 (2000) (“A lawyer’s work is full of 
narrative labor designed to cook up ‘winning’ stories according to hornbook recipes—how to 
unmask the false hero and disclose the true villain of the tale told by one’s opponent, how to 
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different kind of case.  Current reorganization practice reflects one variation 
on this theme. 
II. DUELING METAPHORS AND THE PANIC OF 2008 
Bank Paternalism was undermined by the counter-narratives of the 
Progressive and New Deal era, then displaced altogether by the legislative 
reforms enacted in 1938.46  Although the central features of the old equity 
receiverships have not disappeared, the master narratives of current reorgan-
ization practice are quite different.  The tension between the two principal 
narratives was thrown into high relief by the watershed bankruptcies of the 
2008 Panic—Lehman, Chrysler, and General Motors. 
The first narrative dates back to the 1980s, shortly after the last com-
plete overhaul of the bankruptcy laws in 1978.  According to this narrative, 
bankruptcy is designed to preserve “going concern value” when a large 
company stumbles.  To achieve this objective, bankruptcy prevents creditors 
from making grabs for the company’s assets, and it gives the debtor’s man-
agers an opportunity to negotiate with its creditors over the terms of a reor-
ganization plan. 
This narrative, which I call Debtor in Control, was associated with 
references to bankruptcy as “relief from creditors” and as a “breathing 
spell” for the debtor.47  The Debtor in Control narrative suggested that the 
company and its team of professionals should be given plenty of time to 
determine what went wrong and work with its creditors to develop a plan 
for a healthier future.  The narrative included an appeal to patience and for 
sympathy for the distressed company. 
Within a decade, a backlash developed, with increasingly vocal criti-
cism of the new order.48  Two cases in particular became fodder for critics.  
In the bankruptcy of Eastern Airlines, the bankruptcy judge permitted the 
company to hold its creditors at bay for several years, despite their pleas 
that the company was imploding.49  Eastern never did propose a plan ac-
ceptable to its creditors, and the company collapsed.  In LTV, the company 
  
discomfit the opponent’s witnesses, how to delve a yard below the opponent’s precedents 
and blow them at the moon.”). 
 46. See, e.g., SKEEL, supra note 7, at 119-23. 
 47. See, e.g., H. Rep. No 95-595, 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6296 (describing the automatic 
stay, which prohibits creditors from continuing their efforts to collect what they are owed, as 
giving the debtor a “breathing spell”). 
 48. The scholarly debate centered on an article by Michael Bradley and Michael 
Rosenzweig, which characterized Chapter 11 as disastrously inefficient.  Michael Bradley & 
Michael Rosenzweig, The Untenable Case for Chapter 11, 101 YALE L.J. 1043 (1992). 
 49. For a debate about Eastern and Chapter 11 generally, see James J. White, Com-
ment, Harvey’s Silence, 69 AM. BANKR. L.J. 467 (1995); Harvey R. Miller, Harvey’s Out-
burst: A Rejoinder to Professor White’s Comment, 69 AM. BANKR. L.J. 481 (1995). 
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and its lawyers persuaded the bankruptcy judge to extend LTV’s control for 
a period that eventually ran to nearly seven years.50 
The lawyers who handled the largest cases—such as Harvey Miller at 
Weil, Gotshal—continued to employ and defend the Debtor in Control narr-
ative.  Starting in the late 1980s, Miller criticized the increasing constraints 
on a debtor’s control over the reorganization as a result of creditors’ opposi-
tion to extending the debtor’s exclusive right to propose a reorganization 
plan, the influence of creditors who bought their claims in anticipation of 
bankruptcy, and other factors.  “The erosion of debtors’ rights in chapter 11 
under the guise of creating a level playing field,” he and a co-author warned 
in 1988, “may discourage debtors from seeking protection under the provi-
sions of the Code . . . .”51 
A new narrative began to emerge in the 1990s in connection with 
many of the same practices that Miller and other proponents of Debtor in 
Control had condemned.  In these cases, the debtor and a lender that had 
agreed to finance the debtor’s bankruptcy appeared before the bankruptcy 
judge at the very beginning of the case and insisted that the company would 
collapse unless the judge immediately approved the proposed loan.52  More 
recently, they have increasingly insisted that the court approve both the loan 
and an immediate sale of the company’s most important assets.  Like the 
Debtor in Control narrative, the new narrative—No Time to Spare, I will 
call it—has its own characteristic metaphors.  With No Time to Spare, law-
yers speak of “melting ice cubes.”53  The judge must sign off on everything 
right away, because the company’s assets are a melting ice cube and will (to 
speed up the metaphor) evaporate unless the court springs immediately into 
action.  No Time to Spare is designed to induce an atmosphere of urgency, 
even panic, that makes second guessing unthinkable. 
The Lehman, Chrysler, and General Motors bankruptcies have sub-
jected the Debtor in Control and No Time to Spare narratives to great pres-
sure and posed new questions about the relationship between the two.  
  
 50. See, e.g., Edward I. Altman, Evaluating The Chapter 11 Bankruptcy-
Reorganization Process, 1993 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1, 4. 
 51. Harvey R. Miller & Jacqueline Marcus, The Crumbling Debtor Leverage in 
Chapter 11 Cases—An Implementation or Perversion of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 
1978?, C371 A.L.I-A.B.A. 105, 161 (1988).  See also Harvey R. Miller, Chapter 11 Reor-
ganization Cases and the Delaware Myth, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1987, 2012-14 (2002) (arguing 
that creditor pressure forces companies to confirm reorganization plans that have a short term 
focus). 
 52. For an early illustration of this argument, see David A. Skeel, Jr., The Story of 
Saybrook: Defining the Limits of Debtor-in-Possession Financing, in BANKRUPTCY LAW 
STORIES 177, 189-90 (Robert K. Rasmussen ed., 2007) (describing the contention in Say-
brook case that the business would collapse unless the debtor in possession loan was ap-
proved). 
 53. See, e.g., In re Summit Global Logistics, Inc., No. 08-11566, 2008 Bankr. 
LEXIS 896, at *31 (Bankr. D.N.J. Mar. 26, 2008). 
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When Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy on September 15, 2008—the 
event widely identified as triggering chaos in the financial markets—its 
managers asked the bankruptcy court to immediately approve both interim 
financing by and a sale to Barclays Capital.54  Although the request for first 
day approval of financing is a common feature of No Time to Spare cases, 
the terms of the proposed sale of its assets were highly unusual.  Bankruptcy 
judges have usually insisted on bidding rules that allow several weeks, and 
often more, for the debtor to advertise the sale, look for other bidders, and 
perhaps negotiate a higher price.  Lehman’s lawyers claimed that its in-
vestment banking operations would disintegrate so quickly—it was so ra-
pidly melting an ice cube—that the court should dispense with even these 
limited protections.  “I don’t want to use the melting ice cube,” Lehman’s 
lawyer argued at the hearing to approve the proposed sale.55  “It’s already 
half melted, Your Honor.  The steps [that have] happened [in the past two 
days] make it imperative that this sale be approved.”56 
The No Time to Spare narrative had never been pushed to this ex-
treme, calling for immediate approval of both the financing and the sale of 
such a large company.  Further complicating the proposed sale was the fact 
that the bankruptcy court did not have authority over the Lehman’s invest-
ment banking business at the time Lehman asked the judge to approve a 
sale, because the parent corporation had filed for bankruptcy but the in-
vestment banking subsidiary had not.57  Although the bankruptcy judge ac-
knowledged the extraordinary nature of the case, and warned the hordes 
who attended the sale hearing not to treat his ruling as precedent, he ap-
proved the sale just four days after the case was filed.58 
The Chrysler and General Motors bankruptcies stretched the No Time 
to Spare narrative in a very different way.  Unlike with Lehman, which 
clearly fit the No Time to Spare profile, Chrysler and General Motors 
looked like Debtor in Control cases.  The auto companies’ most significant 
assets—their plants and assembly lines—are fixed and tangible.  Like the 
airlines, many of which have filed for bankruptcy in the past two decades, 
they were obvious candidates for a traditional reorganization process.  In-
deed, most bankruptcy lawyers scoffed when the Obama administration 
began hinting that the restructurings could be carried out within a few 
  
 54. For a more detailed discussion of the Lehman sale, and a critique of the conven-
tional wisdom about the significance of its default, see Kenneth Ayotte & David A. Skeel, 
Jr., Bankruptcy or Bailouts?, 35 J. CORP. L. 469, 489-91 (2010). 
 55. See Transcript of Hearing at 244, In re Lehman Bros. Holdings, Inc., 416 B.R. 
392 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2008) (No. 08-13555). 
 56. Id. 
 57. A creditor objected at the hearing that the sale should not be free and clear of the 
liabilities of subsidiaries that were not actually in bankruptcy, but the judge overruled the 
objection.  Id. at 247-48. 
 58. Id. at 247-48, 251-52. 
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weeks.  But the Chrysler and General Motors were characterized as No 
Time to Spare cases instead. 
The Chrysler bankruptcy was filed first, as a test run for the much 
larger General Motors filing a month later.59  Invoking the No Time to Spare 
narrative, Chrysler and its lawyers insisted that the company’s assets needed 
to be sold immediately.  The sale, “if consummated without delay,” would 
preserve jobs, value, and the company, they wrote in their motion support-
ing the proposed sale.60  If the sale were “not . . . allowed to proceed, on the 
other hand,” 
[Chrysler and its subsidiaries would] likely face the immediate, piecemeal liquida-
tion of their assets in a severely depressed market—affording the Debtors and their 
stakeholders little hope of realizing any significant value.  Moreover, thousands of 
Chrysler employees, and hundreds of thousands of others who work for Chrysler’s 
suppliers and dealers, will lose their jobs in a terrible economic upheaval.  Accor-
dingly, the Debtors are seeking the Court’s approval to proceed expeditiously with 
the [sale].61 
The professed emergency was almost certainly illusory.62  The ostens-
ible buyer of the assets, Fiat, was not actually paying any cash for Chrys-
ler’s assets.  The purchase price—$2 billion—would come entirely from the 
U.S. and Canadian governments.  Fiat’s contribution was to manage the 
new company that was set up to acquire the assets—known informally as 
New Chrysler—and to give New Chrysler access to its technology.  There 
was no reason to believe that Fiat, or the U.S. Treasury, would back out of 
the transaction if it were put on a more leisurely time line.  The “sale” was 
unusual in another respect as well.  It looked a lot more like a reorganization 
than a sale.  In addition to paying the $2 billion, which would go to Chrys-
ler’s senior lenders (and amounted to 29% of what they were owed), New 
Chrysler agreed to give Chrysler retirees a $4.6 billion promissory note and 
55% of New Chrysler’s stock in return for their $10 billion unsecured 
claim; and it agreed to assume $5.3 billion in trade debt. 
Despite these problematic features, the bankruptcy judge approved the 
sale.  Unlike the judge in Lehman, he did so without acknowledging the 
awkwardness of the fit between the No Time to Spare narrative and the de-
tails of the Chrysler transaction.  The Second Circuit was similarly unequi-
vocal in its affirmation of the bankruptcy court decision.  In a key line, the 
court held that even “an automobile manufacturing business can be within 
  
 59. During negotiations with the government, a Chrysler consultant complained to 
Chrysler’s chief executive that the company was simply a “guinea pig.”  See, e.g., George F. 
Will, More Judicial Activism, Please, WASH. POST, June 14, 2009, at A15 (quoting and de-
scribing the exchange). 
 60. Memorandum in Support of Chrysler Sale, supra note 9, at 2. 
 61. Id. 
 62. The Chrysler sale and the questions raised in this paragraph are explored in more 
detail in Mark J. Roe & David Skeel, Essay, Assessing the Chrysler Bankruptcy, 108 MICH. 
L. REV. (forthcoming 2010). 
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the ambit of the ‘melting ice cube’ theory.”63  In its own bankruptcy filing, 
General Motors mimicked Chrysler’s use of the No Time to Spare narrative, 
and extended it still further.  General Motors lacked even the pretense of a 
third party buyer in its “sale.”  The government once again put up all the 
funding, and the new company paid its senior lenders and restructured the 
claims of its employees and other creditors.  Relying heavily on the Chrys-
ler opinion, the bankruptcy judge approved the ostensible sale.64 
The Chrysler and General Motors bankruptcies vividly illustrate the 
most obvious downside of a master narrative.  While the narrative can 
streamline a very complex process, giving the participants well-defined 
roles, it also can be used strategically in cases in which the facts do not fit 
the narrative.  Invoking the No Time to Spare narrative helped the automak-
ers persuade two bankruptcy judges to approve transactions that were very 
difficult to reconcile with ordinary bankruptcy rules.  The narrative was not 
the whole story, of course.  There is substantial reason to doubt whether the 
courts would have approved the transactions in either case had the U.S. 
government not thrown its financial and political weight behind the sales.  
But No Time to Spare provided the narrative framework for the transac-
tions, and for the claim that there was nothing especially unusual about 
them. 
The auto bankruptcies were not the first to misuse the No Time to 
Spare narrative.  In recent years, No Time to Spare has often and increasing-
ly been invoked in cases where the lender also wishes to buy the company’s 
assets—a strategy that bankruptcy lawyers call “loan-to-own.”65  In many of 
these cases, the emergency is artificial, created by the lender’s refusal to 
lend unless the debtor agrees to a prompt sale of its assets.  Some might 
better fit the Debtor in Control paradigm, or at the least, a more leisurely 
campaign to sell the debtor’s assets. 
What then is the status of the Debtor in Control narrative?  Future in-
terpreters may identify Chrysler and GM as the final stage in a transition 
from Debtor in Control to No Time to Spare as bankruptcy’s central narra-
tive.  As No Time to Spare ascended, on this view, its predecessor necessar-
ily receded into the background, eventually to disappear.  Chrysler and GM 
were the final exclamation points.  Both were classic Debtor in Control cas-
es.  The successful use of the No Time to Spare narrative could signal the 
  
 63. In re Chrysler LLC, 576 F.3d 108, 114 (2d Cir. 2009).  The Second Circuit 
opinion was subsequently vacated by the Supreme Court, but the Court left the bankruptcy 
court decision undisturbed.  Ind. State Police Pension Trust v. Crysler LLC, 130 S. Ct. 1015 
(2009). 
 64. In re Gen. Motors Corp., 407 B.R. 463, 497 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009) (describing 
Chrysler as “directly on point and conclusive here”). 
 65. For discussion of the dangers of loan-to-own financing, see, for example, Ken-
neth Ayotte & David A. Skeel, Jr., An Efficiency-Based Explanation for Current Corporate 
Reorganization Practice, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 425, 464-67 (2006). 
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final ascendancy of this narrative in every large reorganization case, no mat-
ter how poor the fit. 
This would be unfortunate.  Even if No Time to Spare now provides 
the standard narrative structure for large corporate bankruptcy cases, the 
availability of at least one alternative narrative could provide a necessary 
check.  If Debtor in Control disappears, every major case will be forced into 
the No Time to Spare mold.  Objectors’ only meaningful recourse will be to 
challenge the narrative on its own terms, asking the court to proceed a little 
less quickly than the debtor and its lenders wish.  With an alternative narra-
tive, by contrast, they can attempt to show the inapplicability of No Time to 
Spare in cases for which it is a poor fit.  There no doubt are limits to the 
benefits of competing narratives.  As much as too many choices can under-
mine the virtues of choice,66 a multiplicity of narratives could dilute the 
chief benefit of a master narrative—the clear roles it assigns to the parties 
and the simple template it provides for the bankruptcy process.  But the 
coexistence of several possible narratives could assure a closer correspon-
dence between the narrative and the underlying facts in any given case.  It 
will be harder to characterize an airline or large industrial firm as No Time 
to Spare, for instance, if the Debtor in Control narrative is available as an 
alternative. 
Bankruptcy’s master narratives have always been closely intertwined 
with the underlying legal structures, which suggests that bankruptcy judges 
and bankruptcy law will determine the future of the current, competing 
narratives.  Bankruptcy judges stand as the gatekeepers in the current 
process since they must approve urgent requests for financing or a sale.67  
They theoretically could curb misuses of the No Time to Spare narrative. 
But their oversight is complicated by the difficulty of second-guessing the 
dire warnings of both a debtor and its lenders that the company will imme-
diately collapse if the transaction is not approved.  There often is no way to 
know for sure if the threat is real, and little time to decide.  By removing 
one of the principal bases for policing questionable No Time to Spare trans-
actions, the Chrysler and General Motors decisions have made the task still 
more difficult for bankruptcy judges in that circuit.68 
If the bankruptcy bench is less than ideally positioned to police the 
two master narratives, a different word of caution is in order for legislative 
reform.69  Congress is not subject to the same urgencies as a bankruptcy 
  
 66. See, e.g., BARRY SCHWARTZ, THE PARADOX OF CHOICE: WHY MORE IS LESS 
(2004). 
 67. Both the financing provision, 11 U.S.C. § 364 (2006), and the sale provision, 11 
U.S.C. § 363(b) (2006), provide only for notice and a hearing as a prerequisite for approval. 
 68. See generally Roe & Skeel, supra note 62. 
 69. Mark Roe and I have suggested a reform that might distinguish between the two 
kinds of cases.  Id. (proposing a rough rule of thumb that would require use of the Chapter 11 
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judge with a particular request before her, and it can act in advance.  But 
lawmakers also are removed from the narrative world of bankruptcy.  There 
sometimes is a lag between the emergence of a new narrative in bankruptcy 
practice and its appearance in Congress.  The last substantial bankruptcy 
reforms, which were enacted in 2005, provide a telling example. 
When it enacted the reforms, Congress seemed to assume Debtor in 
Control was still the norm in large-scale bankruptcy cases, and that large 
cases continued to drag on for far too long, as critics had contended in the 
1980s.  In reality, the No Time to Spare narrative was already in its ascen-
dancy, and changes in bankruptcy practice had all but eliminated the com-
plaints of delay.70  But the 2005 reforms took the earlier era as their refer-
ence point.  One change in particular—a restriction on the period during 
which only the debtor can propose a reorganization plan—addressed an 
issue that no longer existed in most cases, and did so in a way that made 
little sense even for those cases that still fit the Debtor in Control pattern.71 
CONCLUSION 
“Law may be viewed as a system of tension or a bridge linking a con-
cept of a reality to an imagined alternative,” Robert Cover wrote in an ar-
ticle often seen as the touchstone for narrative analysis of law.72  It is, he 
continued, “a connective between two states of affairs, both of which can be 
represented in their normative significance only through the devices of narr-
ative.”73  When a large business flounders, the present crisis often stands in 
contrast to the possibility of a more prosperous future.  To narrate this con-
trast, the managers and other stakeholders of large American businesses 
have relied on master narratives, three of which have been explored in this 
Essay: the Bank Paternalism narrative of the early twentieth century, and 
more recently, the Debtor in Control and No Time to Spare narratives. 
The limited number of master narratives at any given time is perhaps 
best explained by the complexity of a large-scale corporate reorganization, 
and the signal benefits of having a simple template and assigned roles for 
  
process if, among other things, more than half of the stock or debt of the new entity is con-
tinued from the old company). 
 70. See, e.g., Skeel, Creditors’ Ball, supra note 12, at 921 (noting that increased 
creditor control has led to faster cases and more asset sales). 
 71. The provision, which amended 11 U.S.C. § 1121, places an absolute limit of 
eighteen months on the debtor’s “exclusivity” period.  Excessive delay is rarely a concern in 
current reorganization cases, and in cases that do require significant time, the fixed limit on 
the debtor’s exclusivity period may create turmoil as the deadline nears.  Creditors may 
delay, for instance, knowing that the debtor will soon lose control of the case. 
 72. Robert M. Cover, Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 9 
(1983). 
 73. Id. 
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the key participants.  But these benefits also have serious costs.  The most 
obvious is the danger that the narrative will be used to persuade courts to 
approve transactions for which the paradigm is a poor fit.  The presence of 
multiple possible narratives may serve as a partial corrective, decreasing the 
likelihood that cases will be forced in procrustean fashion into a template 
for which they are ill suited. 
